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ARGUMENT 
Through his Petition for Rehearing, Searles claims 
that this Court improperly failed to consider the issue of 
impossibility of performance in reaching its decision to affirm 
the dismissal of Searles' case. Searles does not, however, 
explain how this issue affects the Court's analysis of the case 
or the Court's decision to affirm the trial court* Searles has 
not established that the trial court erred in any of its rulings 
or that the case should be remanded for further proceedings. 
The issue of impossibility of performance is moot 
because Searles failed to present the issue to the trial court. 
Even if Searles had presented the issue to the trial court and 
preserved the issue for appeal, the defense of impossibility of 
performance is inapplicable in the present case. 
I. Searles Failed to Preserve the Issue of Impossibility 
of Performance for Appeal. 
The issue of impossibility of performance was raised 
for the first time in this case in response to a hypothetical 
question from the bench during oral argument on appeal. At 
trial, Searles did not assert or argue the contractual defense 
of impossibility of performance. It is well established that 
the court will not consider a new argument for the first time on 
appeal. See, e.g., Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 
818 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Ct. App. Utah 1991); Progressive 
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Acquisitions, Inc. v. Lvtle, 806 P.2d 239, 242 (Ct. App. Utah 
1991) . 
Searles' Petition for Rehearing appears to be based 
upon a statement in this Court's Memorandum Decision that 
Searles "failed to plead impossibility of performance at trial." 
(Petition, p.6). Searles argues that he was not required by the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to file a written response to 
certain defenses asserted by Dayna in its Answer and, therefore, 
was not required to "plead" impossibility in the trial court. 
Searles misses the point. Issues or matters not 
presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first 
time on appeal. Wurst v. Department of Employment Security, 818 
P.2d 1036, 1039 (Ct. App. Utah 1991) ("It is well-settled that 
the court will not address an issue raised for the first time on 
appeal."); Progressive Acquisitions, Inc. v. Lvtle, 806 P.2d 
239, 242 (Ct. App. Utah 1991) ("It is axiomatic that matters not 
presented to the trial court may not be raised for the first 
time on appeal."). Searles is not precluded from arguing 
impossibility of performance on appeal because he did not 
include the defense in a written pleading. Rather, Searles is 
so precluded because the entire issue of impossibility was not 
presented to the trial court. Because the trial court never 
considered or ruled on the issue of impossibility of 
performance, this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the 
argument on appeal. 
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Although his precise theory is unclear, Searles 
appears to argue that he was not required to present the issue 
of impossibility to the trial court because he was "saving" this 
argument for use in rebuttal. As the plaintiff, Searles had the 
burden of proving his case of breach of contract by a 
preponderance of the evidence. In his own brief, Searles admits 
that "the party who has the affirmative burden of proof is 
required to produce the first evidence on an issue, and at that 
time should produce all his evidence in chief." (Petition, 
p.7). 
To prevail on his breach of contract claim, Searles 
was required to establish the existence of the contract, the 
terms of the contract, his performance of these terms, and 
breach by Dayna. Searles failed to carry his burden of proof. 
At the conclusion of Searles' presentation of the 
evidence, the trial court granted Dayna's motion for involuntary 
dismissal finding that Searles had failed to prove his case. 
The court ruled as follows: 
Count I, the literal contract claim. 
There's been a failure to produce any 
evidence that the defendant violated any 
terms and conditions of the contract in 
terminating the defendant. Defendant, 
according to the evidence, construed in a 
light most favorable for the plaintiff, was 
terminated for cause. 
(R. 396). Similarly, the trial court dismissed Searles' second 
cause of action ruling as follows: "As to the second count, 
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good faith and fair dealing, there is no evidence before the 
Court that there was any unfair dealing or that there was any 
bad faith by the defendant." (R. 396-97). 
Simply stated, the trial court found that Searles had 
failed to establish a prima facie case of breach of contract or 
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. 
The trial court found it unnecessary to hear the evidence of 
Dayna because Searles failed to carry his burden of proof. If 
Searles had additional evidence or legal argument to support his 
claims, he should have presented that evidence in his case in 
chief. 
The trial court gave Searles full opportunity to 
present his case. As described more fully in Dayna's principal 
brief, counsel for Dayna objected to the introduction of any 
evidence by Searles that was offered to vary or contradict the 
terms of the written employment agreement. (Appellee's Brief, 
pp.19-21). Counsel for Searles insisted that the evidence was 
not offered to vary the terms of the agreement, but only as 
foundation and as evidence of whether or not Dayna acted in good 
faith. Searles had every opportunity to present the issue of 
impossibility but failed to do so as demonstrated by the 
following exchange: 
MR. PERKINS: I move for the admission 
of 7-P. 
-4-
MS. LEITH: I would object to the 
admission for any purpose other than to go 
to the issue of good faith. 
THE COURT: Do you have any other 
purposes for offering it? 
MR. PERKINS: Well, we have been 
talking very narrowly about the issue of 
good faith, your Honor. I think there's 
also — there are also issues that have 
related to good faith but that are involving 
implied conditions to the employment 
contract. I believe that it can be shown 
that the company, by implication, said that 
"We're going to provide additional 
personnel, promotional money, money to hire 
new people, and we're going to have product 
ready to be sold and delivered to enable the 
sales force to be able to meet the quota 
goals." 
THE COURT: All right. I'll take 
that to mean it's not being offered to vary 
the term of the contract and with that 
limitation in mind — what is it, 7? 
MR. PERKINS: Yes. 
THE COURT: 7 is received. 
(R. 319-20) (emphasis supplied). 
Thus, Searles had every opportunity to argue that his 
contractual obligations were excused or modified by the defense 
of impossibility of performance. The trial court specifically 
asked counsel for Searles if his evidence was offered for any 
purpose other than to go to the issue of good faith. Even afte: 
this direct invitation from the trial court to present any 
additional legal theories, Searles failed to argue the defense 
of impossibility of performance. 
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II. The Doctrine of Impossibility of Performance is 
Inapplicable to the Present Case. 
Even if Searles had asserted impossibility of 
performance at trial and preserved the issue for appeal, Searles 
could not prevail on his claim against Dayna. Impossibility is 
a contractual defense to liability and may not be asserted by a 
party seeking to enforce the agreement. 
The defense of impossibility recently has been 
described by this Court as follows: 
Under the contractual defense of 
impossibility, an obligation is deemed 
discharged if an unforseen event occurs 
after formation of the contract and without 
fault of the obligated party, which event 
makes performance of the obligation 
impossible or highly impracticable. The 
rationale for this rule is founded on 
principles of assent and basic equity. 
Parties are ordinarily thought to have made 
certain assumptions in visualizing their 
agreement, and those assumptions comprise 
part of the basis and extent of their 
assent. The impossibility defense serves to 
prevent enforcement where those assumptions, 
and hence, the parties assent, prove to be 
faulty. 
Western Properties v. Southern Utah Aviation, Inc., 776 P.2d 
657, 658 (Ct. App. Utah 1989) (footnotes omitted).1 
1
 This analysis is consistent with prior pronouncements 
of the Supreme Court of Utah. See, e.g., Holmgren v. Utah-Idaho 
Sugar Co., 582 P.2d 856, 861 (Utah 1978) ("The doctrine of 
impossibility of performance is one by which a party may be 
relieved of performing an obligation under a contract where 
supervening events, unforeseeable at the time the contract is 
made, render performance of the contract impossible.") (footnote 
omitted). 
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Thus, the defense of impossibility serves to prevent 
enforcement of a contract. Even if the defense of impossibility 
were applicable in this case, both Searles and Dayna would be 
excused from performance. While Searles would not be required 
to meet the sales quota, Dayna would not be required to pay 
Searles as if he had met the sales quota. "A party to a 
contract may not obtain an advantage from the fact that he is 
unable to perform." Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553 (Ct. 
App. Utah 1987); accord Huck v. Haves, 560 P.2d 1124, 1126 (Utah 
1977). 
The proper application of the defense of impossibility 
is illustrated by the case of Western Properties v. Southern 
Utah Aviation, Inc., 776 P.2d 657, 658 (Ct. App. Utah 1989). In 
Western, the plaintiff leased certain vacant land from Cedar 
City located at the Cedar City Airport. The plaintiff in turn 
subleased part of the land to the defendants with a covenant 
that the defendants would construct a maintenance building on 
the land. At the end of the sublease term, the building was to 
become the property of the plaintiff. 
The defendants applied to Cedar City for site plan 
approval for the maintenance building, but the plan could not be 
approved because a master plan for the airport as a whole had 
not been approved. The defendants defaulted in payment of rent 
and abandoned the subleased land without ever constructing a 
maintenance building on the land. 
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The plaintiff sued for unpaid rent and the value of 
the building that it was to have received following the term of 
the sublease. The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's claim 
for rent and the value of the building. 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Utah affirmed. The 
court found that the defendants' obligation to construct the 
building was discharged because it was impossible to construct 
the building without the approval of Cedar City. Similarly, the 
court found that the defendants' obligation to pay rent on the 
subleased land was discharged by the related doctrine of 
frustration of purpose. Although the defendants were not 
precluded from occupying the subleased land, the land was 
undeveloped and could not be used for the purpose contemplated 
by the parties. "Without a way of productively using the land, 
the purpose of the leasehold was effectively frustrated." Id. 
at 659. Accordingly, the covenant to pay rent was also 
discharged. 
In the present case, both Searles and Dayna 
contemplated that Searles would reach the sales quota contained 
in his employment contract. Both parties made certain 
assumptions concerning the potential demand for Dayna's products 
and the availability of those products. If it were literally 
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impossible2 for Searles to perform, the contract itself would 
become invalid based upon a lack of assent by the parties. See 
Western, 776 P.2d at 658. 
III. Searles Is Not Entitled to an Award of Attorneys' Fees 
Because He Is not a Prevailing Party. 
Searles argues that he is entitled to attorneys7 fees 
based upon the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Utah in 
Heslop v. Bank of Utah, 839 P.2d 828 (Utah 1992). Searles 
ignores the fact that he has not prevailed on any of his claims. 
Even if Searles had prevailed on appeal, the appropriate remedy 
would be to remand the case to the trial court for further 
proceedings. Searles claim for attorneys' fees is entirely 
without factual or legal support and this Court should not 
consider it. 
CONCLUSION 
Searles has failed to carry his burden of establishing 
that this Court improperly failed to consider the issue of 
impossibility of performance in its decision to affirm the trial 
court. Similarly, Searles has failed to show that the trial 
court erred in any of its rulings or that the case should be 
remanded for further proceedings. Accordingly, Dayna 
2It is important to note that Searles did not establish at 
trial that it was literally impossible for him to reach the 
sales quotas contained in the employment agreement. 
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respectfully urges this Court to DENY the Petition for 
Rehearing. 
\JU DATED this ^)hjL^ day of December, 1993. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
Jon E. Waddoups 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
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any purpose other than to go to the issue of good faith, 
THE COURT: Do you have any other purposes for 
offering it? 
MR, PERKINS: Well, we have been talking very 
narrowly about the issue of good faith, your Honor. I 
think there's also — there are also issues that have 
related to good faith but that are involving implied 
conditions to the employment contract. I believe that it 
can be shown that the company, by implication, said that 
"We're going to provide additional personnel, promotional 
money, money to hire new people, and we're going to have 
product ready to be sold and delivered to enable the 
sales force to be able to meet the quota goals." 
THE COURT: But does that relate to anything 
that's an attempt to vary the express terms of the 
contract? 
Mft. PERKINS: I don't think it varies the term. 
It, again, goes to good faith by implying these things 
would be done to enable the sales force to meet quota 
and, if not done, it goes to whether or not the 
termination clause of the employment agreement was 
exercised in good faith or not. 
THE COURT: All right. I'll take that to mean 
it's not being offered to vary the term of the contract, 
and with that limitation in mind — what is it, 7? 
64 
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MR. PERKINS: Yes. 
THE COURT: 7 is received. 
MS. LEITH: Thank youf your Honor. 
Q. (By Mr. Perkins) I'll direct your attention to 
the third page of that document, which is an 
organizational chart dated 9-30-88 in the left-hand upper 
corner, and on the right side under Jim Walls, it shows 
Western Area Sales Director, W. Searles, and it has four 
locations, Los Angeles, San Jose, Dallas and Seattle. 
Everywhere but the San Jose entry it shows sales open 
fiscal year '89. 
Now, does that entry mean that it's proposed to 
add a sales employee under Mr. Searles in that location? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And so at that time there was only P. Sun. 
That was someone who was an existing employee? 
A. Yes, Pam Sun. 
Q. Now, were these other three locations — or did 
these other three locations ever receive a sales 
representative as projected? 
A. Los Angeles did. I don't believe we ever hired 
anybody in Dallas or Seattle. May I note that Seattle 
doesn't call for a sales person. It calls for a support 
person. 
Q. What's the difference between sales and 
65 
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1 either a motion for a protective order by the defendant 
2 or motion to compel by the plaintiff, I ordered that 
3 information concerning other employees be produced so 
4 that Mr. Searles would have the opportunity to put on 
5 evidence that his termination was pretextual. No such 
6 evidence came before me today. 
7 With those prefatory matters in mind, I'm going 
8 to grant the motion for the following reasons: 
9 Count 1, the literal contract claim. There's 
JO been a failure to produce any evidence that the defendant 
11 violated any terms and conditions of the contract in 
12 terminating the defendant. Defendant, according to the 
13 evidence, construed in a light most favorable for the 
14 plaintiff, was terminated for cause. Cause is defined by 
15 the contract, not by any moral considerations or anything 
16 like that. Cause in this particular contract is 
17 established, in part, by failure to meet quotas. 
IS The evidence unequivocally indicates that the 
19 I defendant concedes that the quotas were not met. 
20 Therefore, the contract provision on cause could be 
2i invoked, it was invoked, and the termination was had, and 
22 the termination does not constitute a violation of the 
23 contract. 
24 As to the second count, good faith and fair 
25 dealing, there is no evidence before the Court that there 
141 
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1 was any unfair dealing or that there was any bad faith by 
2 the defendant. The evidence does not establish any 
3 requirement of the defendant to provide product, per se. 
4 The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, however, 
5 would prohibit the defendant from failing to provide 
6 product in bad faith. There is no evidence to suggest 
7 that there was bad faith in doing so. 
S There is, however, evidence that would 
9 suggest — and not to credit it or discredit it, all I'm 
10 saying is there's been a failure of evidence. But there 
11 I is evidence to suggest that the failure of providing 
12 product was somewhat natural to this industry in the 
13 sense that that occurs from time to time and that hope 
14 springs eternal, evidently, in this industry, and 
15 frequently prognostications are not met. 
16 The conduct generating the failure to provide 
17 product and necessarily the inability of the plaintiff, 
IS through no fault of his, to meet the quotas was due to 
19 inaccurate projections. 
20 Now, it would be one thing if these quotas were 
2i set after the signing of the contract or that something 
22 occurred thereafter by the defendant and affirmatively 
23 and in bad faith or unfair interfering with defendant to 
24 meet his quotas. There is no evidence of that in this 
25 case. 
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